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Using a unique household-level dataset on the situation after the Kobe earthquake in 1995, we 
test the full consumption risk sharing hypothesis, relaxing the separability assumption, and 
examine households’ simultaneous choice of risk coping measures.    Using multivariate probit 
estimations, we find that the full consumption insurance hypothesis is strongly rejected and our 
results indicate that households’ utility across different expenditure items is not separable.    As 
for households’ choice of risk-coping measures, households borrowed extensively against 
housing damage, but relied on dissaving to cope with smaller asset damage, implying a hierarchy 
of risk-coping measures from dissaving to borrowing.     
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1.  Introduction 
 
          Natural disasters take place in both developed and developing countries and their number 
has been continuously increasing over the last fifty years [EM-DAT (2007)].    In the past few 
years alone, there have been several major disasters that resulted in tremendous human and 
economic losses, including the Asian tsunami in 2004, Hurricane Katrina in 2005, and the 
earthquakes in Pakistan and Indonesia in 2005.    Japan, too, has suffered severe natural disasters 
and probably is more at risk, especially from earthquakes, than many other countries.    During 
the twentieth century, Japan experienced a considerable number of large earthquakes – defined as 
earthquakes registering five or more points on the Richter scale – in a variety of regions: there 
were a total 32 such earthquakes during the first half of the century and 35 during the second half.   
In addition, since 2001 alone, Japan has experienced more than 11 large earthquakes.  Of  these 
large earthquakes, the Great Kanto earthquake in 1923, striking the area that includes Tokyo, 
caused the greatest human loss, claiming about 100,000 lives, but in terms of the economic 
damage caused measured in monetary loss, the Great Hanshin Awaji earthquake (hereafter, the 
Kobe earthquake) was the largest. 
The Kobe earthquake struck at 5:46 a.m. on January, 17, 1995, hitting an area that contains 
one of Japan’s main industrial clusters as well as major shipping ports and is home to 4 million 
people.    The earthquake, which had registered 7.3 on the Richter scale, cost 6,432 lives 
(excluding 3 missing persons), resulted in 43,792 injured, and damaged 639,686 buildings, of 
which 104,906 were completely destroyed [Fire and Disaster Management Agency (2006)].   
Together with Hurricane Katrina, the Kobe earthquake was responsible for the largest economic 
damage due to natural disaster in history: the loss in housing property amounted to more than   3
US$60 billion, while that in capital stock exceeded US$100 billion [Horwich (2000)].    The 
purpose of this study is to examine the effects of a large disaster on people’s economic behavior 
in the affected area utilizing a unique household-level dataset collected from the Kobe area 
shortly after the earthquake.    First, we explore whether households in the affected areas succeed 
in smoothing consumption in face of the disaster.    Second, we investigate how people in the 
area utilized risk-coping measures to mitigate changes in consumption.    While most previous 
studies have examined these issues separately, we adopt an integrated approach, examining both 
of the success and/or failure of consumption smoothing and the determinants of what risk-coping 
strategies are adopted in the face of a variety of unexpected shocks.   
          In order to address these issues, we perform two sets of analyses in our paper.    First, we 
test the full consumption insurance hypothesis, or equivalently, full consumption risk sharing 
hypothesis to determine whether people in the Kobe area succeeded in smoothing their 
consumption.    We extend the empirical strategy of Cochrane (1991) and Mace (1991) to the 
case of a non-separable utility function across multiple goods.    Our analysis shows that the full 
risk-sharing hypothesis is strongly rejected and people in the affected area did not succeed in 
consumption smoothing, which suggests that formal and/or informal insurance mechanisms to 
cope with an earthquake were ineffective.    Moreover, we reject the separability hypothesis 
across ten different expenditure items.    Second, we examine which of a wide variety of formal 
and informal insurance mechanisms is adopted against earthquake using the framework 
developed by Fafchamps and Lund (2003).    We compare three different risk-coping strategies: 
dissaving, borrowing, receiving transfers from private and public sources.    We found that the 
risk-coping means are specific to the nature of the loss caused by the earthquake.    Households 
borrow extensively to compensate for housing damage but rely on dissaving to compensate for   4
damage to other assets.    Transfers are likely to be effective against mild shocks and adopted 
particularly by multi-generation households.     
     By  performing  these  analyses,  we  attempt  to contribute to the rich existing literature on 
consumption insurance and households’ risk coping strategies as well as to policy debates on 
disaster management in three aspects.    First, most existing studies have not utilized natural 
disasters to test the full consumption risk sharing model.    Since natural disasters cause 
exogenous shocks to households and are in most cases unexpected, empirical investigations are 
less hampered by econometric problems than studies using other episodes.    As a natural 
experiment, an earthquake provides an unusual opportunity to identify market completeness and 
households’ responses to an exogenous event [Rosenzweig and Wolpin (2000)].    Most previous 
studies that have tested the full consumption insurance model, such as Mace (1991), Cochrane 
(1991), Hayashi et al. (1996), and Townsend (1994), employed income changes, information on 
illness, involuntary job loss, and strikes as shock variables, which are not perfectly exogenous to 
households’ decisions, resulting in a possible estimation bias due to measurement errors and 
endogeneity [Ravallion and Chaudhuri (1997)].    The merit of exploring natural disaster events 
is reinforced by the natural assumption that the Kobe earthquake was entirely unexpected.    One 
of the reasons why the disaster was unexpected is that it has been almost a millennium since a 
comparable earthquake took place in the Kansai region, where Kobe is located [Horwich (2000)].   
That people in the Kobe area did not anticipate the disaster is also evident from the fact that only 
3% of the properties in Hyogo Prefecture were covered by earthquake insurance.
1  According  to 
prefectural level information on earthquake insurance payments after the Kobe earthquake, Japan 
Agriculture (JA) was the dominant insurance provider in Hyogo Prefecture, the prefecture in 
which the Kobe area is located.    This means that most of those who had earthquake insurance 
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were full-time or part-time farmers.    Since the Kobe earthquake hit the urban center, the number 
of those in the affected areas who had earthquake insurance was very small. 
          Second, the traditional full consumption risk sharing model assumes that information is 
publicly available [Mace (1991); Cochrane (1991); Hayashi et al. (1996); Townsend (1994); 
Simizutani  (2003)].  However,  this  assumption  is unrealistic and the income and other shock 
variables in existing studies are likely to be private information rather than public knowledge; it 
is therefore difficult to justify one of the main assumptions used to derive theoretically the full 
risk-sharing model [Ligon (1998)].    In contrast, the housing and asset damages caused by a 
disaster are more likely to be known to everyone and the magnitude of the damage is measured 
in a uniform formula employed by local governments to issue formal certificates for housing 
damage.    Thus, the shocks that we use in this paper to examine the economic effects on 
households are more appropriate for testing the full consumption risk sharing hypothesis.     
     Third,  we  explicitly  assume  non-separability  across  different  expenditure  items  and  risk 
coping strategies.    Most previous studies on full consumption risk sharing tests heavily depend 
on the assumption of separability but this assumption is rarely examined [Mace (1991)].    An 
exception is a study by Attanasio and Weber (1995), which shows that considering particular 
consumption items in isolation can yield very misleading results.    Moreover, the separability 
assumption may be even more problematic in the case of an extraordinary shock, such as one 
caused by an earthquake, since such a large shock might substantially alter household 
preferences across goods and affect households’ consumption of different items simultaneously, 
not separately.    Our model allows us to test the validity of the separability assumption of the 
utility function by employing a multivariate probit model which considers the simultaneity of 
expenditure decisions on different items or of different coping devices.    Our findings show that   6
the assumption of separability is overwhelmingly violated.     
        In addition to examining consumption smoothing and the choice of risk coping strategies, 
we also aim to contribute to the policy debate on the effective management of risks induced by 
natural disasters.    Since governments’ role can be limited to compensating for the large losses 
caused by natural disasters, it is important to inform policy makers of how efficiently people 
cope with earthquake damage by themselves.    Notably, in spite of the tremendous damage, 
economic recovery in the Kobe area was much faster than initially expected [Horwich (2000)].   
Accordingly, lessons from the “success” in the wake of the Kobe earthquake may be crucial for 
designing appropriate policies to deal with future natural disasters both in developed and 
developing countries experiencing frequent natural disasters.   
          Although this study is not the first to examine the effects of the Kobe earthquake, we 
would like to emphasize that our studies differs from earlier ones in two important respects.   
First, there has been little research on the full consumption insurance hypothesis that considers 
the non-separability of goods in the context of a natural disaster.    Kohara et. al. (2006) rejected 
the full consumption insurance hypothesis in the case of the Kobe earthquake, but they did not 
take into account the direct losses of each household.
2    In a previous paper [Sawada and 
Shimizutani (2007a)], we used the same dataset as this study to examine the full insurance 
hypothesis employing an ordered probit model but did not consider non-separability across 
multiple goods.    In contrast, we test the full consumption risk sharing hypothesis with a 
non-separable utility function. 
     Second,  we  explicitly  investigate  the  reason behind the strong rejection of the full 
consumption risk sharing hypothesis and examine the relative effectiveness of various 
risk-coping devices against sudden natural disasters.,    The use of earthquake data differentiate 
                                            
2  Furthermore, Kohara et. al. (2006) did not examine households’ risk coping devices.   7
our study from most previous studies which deal with household responses to general shocks.   
Moreover, to our knowledge, few studies have employed household-level data in order to 
investigate jointly and quantitatively the role of savings, borrowing, and other risk-coping 
devices [Rosenzweig (2001)].    An exception is a study by Fafchamps and Lund (2003), who 
investigated the joint determination of risk-coping strategies in the rural Philippines, and we take 
a similar approach to theirs to examine households’ choice of risk-coping strategy against a 
natural disaster.    In another paper using the same data set [Sawada and Shimizutani (2007b)], 
we examined the determinants of mutual insurance mechanism through borrowing and private 
transfers separately, mainly focusing on the difference between borrowing-constrained and 
non-constrained households.    However, the paper does not address the joint determination of 
risk-coping strategies, nor does it consider self insurance (dissaving).    This prevented us from 
examining the choice of risk coping device under non-separability.    We bridge this gap in the 
previous studies by employing a general model which nests both separable and non-separable 
cases. 
     The  remainder  of  this  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  presents  the  theoretical 
model employed in this study, while Section 3 provides a brief overview of the data set.    In 
Section 4, we explain the empirical specifications and the estimation results of the full 
consumption insurance model.    The estimation results of the determinants of risk-coping 
strategies are provided in Section 5 which is followed by concluding remarks in Section 6.   
 
2.  The Theoretical Framework 
 
Households have developed formal and informal risk-coping mechanisms to deal with a   8
wide variety of shocks in their day-to-day lives [Besley (1995); Fafchamps (2003); Fafchamps 
and Lund (2003); Townsend (1994)].    Such risk-coping measures can be divided into two types: 
mutual insurance and self-insurance [Hayashi (1996)].    Mutual insurance provides consumption 
smoothing opportunities across households through market or non-market mechanisms [Mace 
(1991)].    First, formal insurance markets act as effective consumption insurance by nature.   
Second, households can utilize credit market transactions, i.e., rely on borrowing, to smooth 
consumption by reallocating future resources to current consumption.
3    Third, a household can 
achieve consumption smoothing through informal arrangements of state-contingent mutual 
transfers among relatives, friends, and neighbors [Cochrane (1991); Hayashi et al. (1996); Mace 
(1991); Townsend (1987, 1994)].
4    Finally, governments can also complement the risk-coping 
behavior of households.    Direct public transfers through means-tested targeting, tagging, or 
geographical/group targeting such as unemployment insurance or workfare can act as a formal 
safety net for households facing difficulties.     
     Self-insurance  can  be  attained  by  dissaving.  In  the  event  of  unexpected  negative  shocks, 
households can utilize their own financial and physical assets that have been accumulated 
beforehand [Carroll and Kimball (2006); Lee and Sawada (2007)].    Such precautionary savings 
can be in the form of bank deposits, cash holdings, jewelry, or physical assets like real estate.     
Skidmore (2001) has attributed the high savings rate of the Japanese to the high frequency of 
catastrophes such as earthquakes, volcanic eruptions, landslides, and typhoons.     
                                            
3  It can be shown theoretically that a lack of consumption insurance is compensated for by easy access to the 
credit market [Eswaran and Kotwal (1989)].    However, households often have limited access to credit 
markets, which can be attributed to high information costs and/or lack of assets for collateral.    The existence 
of credit constraints has a significant negative impact on households’ asset portfolio choice and risk-coping 
abilities [Paxson (1990); Lee and Sawada (2007)].     
4  It is also important to note that the self-enforcement mechanisms of this self-interested mutual insurance 
scheme could be sustained as sub-game perfect Nash equilibria in a repeated game framework [Coate and 
Ravallion (1993); Kocherlakota (1996)].       9
     In  what  follows,  we  present  a  model of full consumption insurance incorporating 
non-separability across different expenditure items.    We then formulate a simple theoretical and 
empirical framework to examine the effectiveness of risk-coping measures employed for mutual 
and self-insurance to deal with unexpected damages caused by natural disasters.   
 
2.1 Full Consumption Risk-Sharing 
 
First, we formulate full consumption insurance model in a pure exchange economy to 
characterize the role of mutual insurance [Cochrane (1991); Mace (1991); Townsend (1987)].   
We aim to test the efficacy of informal/formal networks and/or markets to achieve efficient 
resource allocation.    Let us assume that households trade dated claims contingent upon a 
sequence of states at time t, s
t = [s0, s1,  ŋŋŋ, st], where st refers to publicly observable states at 
time t.    All of these claims are traded at time zero and there exists a complete set of securities 
for these contingent claims that are traded at the state-contingent price, i.e., households purchase 
a history-dependent consumption plan.    Then the optimization problem of household i, deriving 
concave instantaneous utility from consumption of multiple goods, c
m, can be represented as 
intertemporal utility maximization subject to a lifetime budget constraint given contingent 
market prices.    Such an optimization problem can be solved as the Pareto-optimal consumption 
allocation of a hypothetical social planner.    The problem corresponds to Negishi’s (1960) 
weighted utility maximization subject to the economy’s goods market equilibrium condition 
[Mace (1991)]: 
   10
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where 
i λ   is the weight for the ith household, π is the probability attached to a particular history 
of states, ω represents the household’s stochastic endowment of each good that is exogenously 
given and depends on the realization of st, and Ω
t represents a set of the entire history of all 
possible states at time t.    We impose a common-knowledge assumption that there exists an 
objective probability, π (s
t), for the occurrence of s
t.    We also assume the same time discount 
rate δ across households.    From the first order conditions of this problem, we have an optimal 


























       (2) 
 
where µ
m denotes the Lagrange multiplier associated with the feasibility constraint of each good.   
This equation indicates that the hypothetical social planner will allocate endowments so as to 
equalize households’ weighted marginal utility across household.    It should be noted that µ
m is a 
negative function of initial income and assets.    From equation (2), we have: 
























Equation (3) shows that, under the full consumption insurance hypothesis, households’ allocation   11
of consumption should be independent of idiosyncratic endowment changes.   
 
2.1 Non-separable utility function 
 
Most existing studies on full insurance further impose the assumption of a single good 
or separable multiple goods to secure sufficient tractability.    However, the validity of the 
separability assumption has been rarely examined; an exception is a paper by Attanasio and 
Weber (1995).    In order to bridge the gap in previous studies, we assume that the utility function 
is time- and state-separable but non-separable across goods.    We follow Mace (1991) to 
postulate exponential utility: 
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where a
m is a goods specific taste shock.    Considering the case of two goods, i.e., m=1 and 2, 
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where ∆ is a first-difference operator and   
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=1
1
.        (7) 
 
Hence, we obtain cov(u
1, u
2)≠0 under non-separability.    When utility is separable (σ=α), we 
obtain ξ=0, indicating that cov(u
1, u
2)=0 [Mace (1991)].    Equations (5) and (6) indicate that, 
under full insurance, idiosyncratic household income changes should be absorbed by all other 
members in the same insurance network.    As a result, idiosyncratic income shocks should not 
affect consumption changes.     
  Taking the weighted average of equations (5) and (6) with the consumption share as the 
weight, we can obtain the equation of aggregated consumption for household i at time t, which is 
usually employed to test whether the full consumption risk sharing hypothesis holds.   
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2.3 Risk-coping strategies 
 
          Next, we turn to the theoretical discussion of the determinants of households’ risk-coping 
strategy.    Even in the absence of full consumption risk sharing for contingent claims, 
households are able to insure themselves against unexpected shocks.    We follow Fafchamps and 
Lund’s (2003) model of risk coping behavior under perfect or imperfect risk sharing model.   
From the individual intertemporal budget constraint, we have yt
T + yt
N - nt = st + ct, where yt
T, yt
N, 
nt, and st are transfer income, non-transfer income, a negative shock to household assets, and net 
savings, respectively [Fafchamps and Lund (2003)].    We assume that transfer income is   13
determined endogenously, while non-transfer income and asset shocks are exogenously given.   
Following Fafchamps and Lund (2003), combining the intertemporal budget constraint 
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where b and d are borrowing and dissaving, respectively.    The last term on the right-hand side 
represents the mean zero independent expectation error.    Equation (8) formally shows that there 
are three possible risk-coping strategies against realized negative shocks: additional borrowing, 
receiving transfer income, or dissaving.     
 
3.  The Data Set and Summary Statistics 
 
          We take advantage of a rich household-level dataset from the Shinsai-go no Kurashi no 
Henka kara Mita Shohi Kozo ni Tsuite no Chosa Hokokusho (Research Report on Post-Disaster 
Changes in Lifestyles and Consumption Behavior).    The survey was conducted by the Hyogo 
Prefectural government in October 1996, twenty months after the disaster, in the five areas 
seriously damaged by the earthquake: Kobe’s Higashinada, Kita, and Suma wards, Akashi City, 
and Nishinomiya City [Hyogo Prefecture (1997)].
5    The survey was completed by 1,589 women 
aged above 30, who were selected on the basis of a stratified random sampling scheme.    For 
more information, see Sawada and Shimizutani (2005; 2007b).     
                                            
5 The dataset was released on March 25, 1997, by Hyogo-ken Seikatsu Bunka-bu Seikatsu Sozo-ka Shohi 
Seikatsu Taisaku-shitsu (Hyogo Prefecture, Department of Livelihood and Culture, Livelihood Creation 
Section, Office for Livelihood Policy).       14
     Definitions  and  summary  statistics  of  variables  are  given  in  Table  1.  First,  we  observe  a 
variety of shocks caused by the earthquake.
6    About 30 percent of households in the sample 
experienced major or moderate damage to their housing and an additional 40 percent of 
households suffered minor damage.    In total, about 70 percent of households in the sample 
suffered damage to their housing.    Moreover, 70 percent of the sample households suffered 
major damage to household assets while an additional 20 percent experienced minor damage to 
household asset.    In other words, more than 90 percent of respondents experienced some sort of 
damage to household assets.    As to the income changes before and after the earthquake, 6 % 
and 34% of all respondents faced positive and negative income shocks, respectively, caused by 
the earthquake.    About 60% of respondents reported that there was no income change.    These 
figures demonstrate the seriousness of the economic loss caused by the earthquake.    At the 
same time, the disaster caused a variety of exogenous shocks to residents in the Kobe area and 
allows us to perform a powerful test to identify the effect of the shocks on households’ behavior.   
          Second, we find that more than 60 percent of respondents answered that their household’s 
overall consumption changed after the earthquake.      Although our data do not allow us to 
identify whether consumption increased or decreased, what is clear is that a large proportion of 
victims altered their consumption behavior after the event.    The survey also provides ten 
different expenditure categories and asked respondents with regard to which item their 
consumption changed.    We observe a large variation across expenditure items.    About 30 
percent of households changed their expenditure on furniture reflecting the large proportion of 
residents who suffered damage to household assets.    Moreover, a quarter of households altered 
                                            
6  First, the survey was carried out in order to record the details of the damage respondents suffered as a result 
of the earthquake, such as damage to their housing, to household assets, and to the health of family members.   
It should be noted that, shortly after the earthquake, local governments conducted metrical surveys and issued 
formal certificates for housing damage, with which households could later obtain government compensation.   
Therefore, we believe that the information obtained on housing damage is fairly objective and accurate.       15
their expenditure on clothing and more than 20 percent changed their expenditure on daily goods.   
In contrast, less than 10 percent of households changed their expenditure on luxuries, leisure, or 
gifts.    We will examine which type of shocks caused changes in consumption behavior for each 
category below.   
          Next, the survey asked respondents if they had experienced an increase in expenditure due 
to the earthquake, and if so, how they had coped with the increase.    More than 80 percent 
replied that their expenditure had increased as a result.    However, some households did not 
disclose how they coped with the extra expenditure caused by the earthquake.    Consequently, 
our analysis concentrates on households that experienced a change in expenditure and provided 
information on their coping strategy, while households that did not change their expenditure or 
that changed their expenditure but did not indicate their coping mechanism are excluded from 
our sample for the risk-coping analysis.    Among the households that increased their expenditure 
due to the earthquake, approximately 25 percent managed to cope by changing the composition 
of consumption and more than half relied on their savings.    Borrowing and receiving transfers 
represented important risk-coping strategies for approximately 10 percent and 12 percent of valid 
responses, respectively.    When estimating various risk-coping models, we employ binary 
dependent variables for the three risk-coping strategies, i.e., borrowing, receiving private/public 
transfers,,and dissaving.
7   
     Turning  to  household  characteristics,  the rate of house ownership was approximately 70 
                                            
7  The questionnaire inquired about both the most important strategy (single choice) and other strategies 
(multiple choices).    The estimation described in this study only utilizes the single-choice answers.   
Borrowing includes borrowing from financial institutions, relatives, and/or friends.    Dissaving includes the 
drawing down of savings for retirement, for children (e.g., education costs), housing expenditure (purchases or 
renovation), the purchase of durables (e.g., automobiles), spending on leisure (personal trips), and preparing 
for unexpected events (disasters or sickness).    Ideally we could have divided transfers into private and public 
ones.    Yet, the small shares of private and public transfers did not allow the multivariate probit estimation to 
converge.  
   16
percent prior to the earthquake and approximately 30 percent of all households had outstanding 
housing loans.    The average age of respondents was 51 years and the level of educational 
attainment of the majority of respondents was high school graduate or lower.    A majority of 
respondents lived with their children, while approximately 20 percent lived with their parents or 
grandchildren.    In terms of marital status, 5 percent of the surveyed respondents were single.
8  
Finally, in order to control for average consumption changes in equations (5), (6), and (9) and 
unobserved heterogeneity which may result from differences in the impact of the earthquake, we 
include district-specific dummy variables.    Since, among other things, the average effects of the 
earthquake are determined by the proximity to its hypocenter, we believe that the inclusion of the 
district dummies is reasonable.     
 
4.  Testing the Full Consumption Insurance Model   
 
          First, we test the full consumption insurance model of equations (5) and (6).    Following 
Cochrane (1991) and Ravallion and Chaudhuri (1997), an estimation equation based on 
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where k is an identifier of regional insurance networks and R
a is a dummy variable, which is 
equal to one if the ith household is located in the region, k.    We use the area dummies for the 
                                            
8  Also, household income at the time of the survey was recorded by income category.    Median annual 
household income was between ¥6 million and 8 million (approximately US$50,000-67,000).       17
variable R
a to control for consumption averages in equations (6) and (7).    The matrix S 
comprises indicators of the damage to housing and household assets, while the matrix X consists 
of household characteristics to control for the observed part of household taste shocks.    The 
final term on the right-hand side of the equation is a well-behaved error term.    The null 
hypothesis of a full consumption insurance market is that all the elements of the vector γ in 
equation (10) are jointly zero.     
     Unfortunately,  we  do  not  have  data  on  expenditure  amounts.  However,  qualitative 
information on changes in the expenditure on the following ten consumption categories is 
available: food, daily goods, clothing, luxuries, leisure, gifts, furniture, electronic products, 
housing, and emergency supplies.    We construct an indicator variable, I
c, which takes a value of 
one if a household changed its expenditure on item m and zero if no change in consumption is 








> + + + = ∑
=










i u X S R I β γ δ         ( 1 1 )  
 
where m refers to each item of goods (m=1,2, …, 10).    As discussed in Section 2, it is natural to 
assume that households’ preferences with regard to multiple goods are not additively separable in 
the face of an unusual disaster shock and we consider the joint-determination of expenditure on 
each item.    Under the assumption of joint normality of the error terms, our model is a 
ten-equation multivariate probit model to take into account the fact that household expenditure is 
determined by a simultaneous decision-making process.    If the utility function is separable, 
error terms should be uncorrelated across consumption items, but if utility is not separable across 
goods, the error term in each equation is correlated with those in the other equations.    For   18
identification, we need to impose the conditions that var(ũi
m) = 1 for all m and that the 
variance-covariance matrix of ũi
m is symmetric.    In order to estimate the parameters under this 
setting, we can employ the log-likelihood function, which depends on the joint standard normal 
distribution function.    We utilize the algorithm given in Cappellari and Jenkins (2003) in order 
to estimate the multivariate probit model using the method of simulated maximum likelihood, 
also known as the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) estimator.     
     Table  2  reports  the  estimation  results for the full-insurance model when households’ 
preferences are not separable across multiple goods.    We find that the full consumption 
insurance model is rejected except for the case of gift expenditure.    When we look at each item 
closely, we find that the expenditure on furniture and on housing is proportional to the disaster 
damage to housing, but in the case of other items, most of the coefficients on housing damage are 
not statistically significant.    Households which suffered damage to their household assets were 
more likely to change their expenditure on daily goods, clothing, furniture, electronic products, 
and emergency supplies.    It is interesting to note that changes in expenditure on five out of ten 
items are correlated with the variable indicating that the health of a family member was affected 
by the earthquake, implying that health shocks substantially alter consumption behavior.   
Finally, although we do not report the covariances for each pair of error terms, all covariances 
are positive and statistically significant at the 1 percent level, indicating that our assumption of 
non-separability across goods is justified.     
          In summary, our analysis produces two main findings.    First, we conclude that formal and 
informal mutual insurance mechanisms to deal with the impact of the earthquake were 
incomplete and, as a result, people in the affected area did not succeed in smoothing their 
consumption.    This finding indicates that households were not able to efficiently cope with the   19
damage and were forced to change their expenditure patterns.    Second, we find supportive 
evidence that households’ preferences were not separable across multiple goods and that the 
various types of damage sustained cause a substantial variation in expenditure on each category.   
This means that the implicit assumption of separability, which is frequently employed in most 
previous studies on full consumption risk sharing, should be examined carefully in future studies.   
 
5.  The Determinants of Risk-coping Strategies 
 
          The full consumption insurance model is rejected in the case of the Kobe earthquake.   
However, a test of full consumption risk-sharing provides little information on the way risks are 
shared among people.    Thus, in order to examine these issues, we apply the empirical model of 
Fafchamps and Lund (2003) and investigate households’ risk coping behavior against damages 
caused by the earthquake.    Since the adoption of a particular risk-coping strategy is observed as 
a discrete variable in our data, we jointly estimate three binary-dependent variable models based 
on the different risk-coping strategies.    Based on equation (9), we assume that the three 
different risk-coping strategies are dependent on each other through the correlations of error 
terms, εm, m=1, 2, 3 and 4.   
 
  ∆bi = Yiθ1
Y + Siθ1





S + Xiβ2 + ε2i, (13) 
  ∆di = Yiθ3
Y + Siθ3
S + Xiβ3 + ε3i, (14) 
  p1i = 1[∆bi > 0],  (15) 
  p2i = 1[∆y
ET
i > 0],  (16)   20
  p4i = 1[∆di > 0],  (17) 
 
where Y represents household income changes.    We do not directly observe the intensities of the 
risk-coping strategy, i.e., ∆b, ∆y
T, and ∆d; rather, whether a particular risk-coping strategy is 
adopted is observed as a discrete variable.    Hence, our dependent variables express whether a 
household adopted a particular risk-coping device, which can be represented by three indicator 
variables, pm, m = 1, 2 and 3.    We assume that the variance-covariance matrix of εmi is 
symmetric and the covariances are not necessarily zero.    We need to impose the condition 
var(ε1i) = var(ε2i) = var(ε3i) = 1 for identification.    Under the assumption of joint normality of 
the error terms, our model is a three-equation multivariate (trivariate) probit model.    Similar to 
the estimation in the previous section, we employ the algorithm given in Cappellari and Jenkins 
(2003) to obtain the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-Keane (GHK) estimator.     
       T a b l e   3   r e p o r t s   t h e   r e s u l t s ,   w h i c h   c a n   b e  summarized as follows.    First, the negative 
income shock variable has positive coefficient for the borrowing equation, indicating that 
borrowing is effective against negative income shock.    The positive income change variable 
affect transfers positively. This may suggest that more transfers are provided if income becomes 
larger, which may be seen as a case of the self-interested exchanges in Cox (1987).    Yet, these 
income change coefficients are largely insignificant.    Since equation (9) indicates that the full 
consumption risk-sharing hypothesis is consistent with a significant coefficient on income 
changes, these results are not necessarily supportive to the full risk sharing hypothesis.     
Second, the column for borrowing reveals that people primarily coped with major or 
minor housing damages by borrowing.    Additionally, we observe that borrowing was possible 
particularly for those who owned houses prior to the earthquake, which highlights the importance   21
of collateral in obtaining a loan after the earthquake [Sawada and Shimizutani (2007b)].   
Alternatively, credit-constrained households might have been unable to utilize borrowing as a 
risk-coping device against the negative shocks caused by the earthquake.    The marginally 
significant and positive coefficient on the dummy indicating whether a respondent lived with 
parents or grandchildren is consistent with anecdotal evidence that the constructions of nisetai 
jutaku (two-generation houses) by using housing loans gained great popularity among 
households who lost their house because of the earthquake, since households with multiple 
generations find it easier to borrow and thus construct new houses.   
The column for transfers in Table 3 shows the results for the determinants of aggregate 
transfers from private and public sources.    While the results are less evident than those on 
borrowing, we find that the coefficient on the moderate housing damage is statistically 
significant, suggesting that, with transfers, households weathered such damage.    That receiving 
transfers is correlated with the size of the damages is partly explained by the fact that the public 
committee in charge of allocating people’s contributions distributed larger amounts of money to 
households with greater damage to their houses.    In contrast to borrowing, the coefficient on the 
dummy variable indicating whether a respondent lived with parents or grandchildren is negative 
and significant, implying that those households are less likely to depend on transfers.    This is 
natural since family members of those types of households are more likely to suffer from the 
same disaster and are less affordable than those households whose family members live 
separately and are more likely to be insured from damages caused by the earthquake.    Moreover,   
most coefficients on the area dummies are significantly negative, implying that receiving 
transfers is affected by each region’s indigenous character.   
Third, the last column reports the results on the effectiveness of self-insurance.    Since   22
the coefficient on the dummy variable for minor household asset damage is positive and 
marginally significant, we may conclude that dissaving was employed as a risk-coping device in 
the case of minor damage to households’ assets.    Along with the finding that households relied 
on dissaving to compensate for smaller losses but coped with larger shocks by borrowing, our 
empirical findings suggest the existence of a hierarchy of risk-coping measures, starting from 
dissaving to borrowing.    Moreover, those living with children were less likely to use dissaving 
as a coping strategy, as they probably had not accumulated sufficient precautionary savings.     
Finally, the estimated correlations between the error terms in the case of the trivariate 
probit models are shown in Table 4.    The correlations overwhelmingly reject the null hypothesis 
of independent error terms, a finding that supports the adoption of the trivariate probit model.   
More importantly, the covariances for the error terms of the borrowing and dissaving equations 
and of the transfer and dissaving equations are both negative.    These findings imply that there 
exists a unobservable factor to account for negative correlation between dissaving and other risk 
coping devices and suggests that self-insurance acts as a compensation for the lack of mutual 
insurance.    On the other hand, the covariance of the error terms of borrowing and transfers is 
positive, suggesting a complementary relation between borrowing and receiving transfers, 
though the coefficient is not significant.
9    
 
6.  Concluding Remarks 
 
In this study, we examined how people in the areas damaged by the Kobe earthquake in 
1995 altered their expenditure and how they compensated for the losses sustained.    We utilized 
                                            
9  The direction of the coefficient indicates that the rich, with collateralizable assets, can obtain both loans and 
transfer incomes, while the poor are excluded both from credit markets and from insurance networks against 
natural disasters.   23
a unique household-level dataset collected shortly after the earthquake.    First, according to our 
estimation results, the full risk-sharing hypothesis is strongly rejected.    Also, our results support 
a model that shows households’ preferences are not separable across consumption items.     
Second, we then investigated the effectiveness of households’ strategies to cope with losses 
caused by the earthquake since households were able to adopt a wide variety of risk-coping 
devices against the negative shocks created by the earthquake.    We found that the means of 
coping were specific to the nature of the shock sustained as a result of the earthquake.   
Borrowing was extensively used to cope with housing damage, while dissaving was relied on to 
compensate for damage to smaller household assets.    Additionally, we observed that dissaving 
and borrowing/transfers acted as substitutes.    These findings suggest the existence of a 
hierarchy of risk-coping measures, starting from dissaving to borrowing.     
Two policy implications can be drawn from these findings.    First, the failure to smooth 
consumption after the disaster may have been mitigated by ex ante devices and it is imperative to 
design ex ante risk-management policies against earthquakes.  The  participation  rate  in 
earthquake insurance was very low before the earthquake.    Without effective ex ante measures, 
the actual economic losses caused by an earthquake as enormous as the Great Hanshin-Awaji 
earthquake are too large for the government to support effectively.    One example of ex ante 
mitigation is the further development of markets for earthquake insurance, which generate proper 
incentives to invest in mitigating the effect of earthquakes, such as investment in 
earthquake-proof construction.    These ex ante measures would significantly reduce the overall 
social loss caused by an earthquake.    Although our data set does not contain information on ex 
ante risk coping measures, future research should incorporate people’s preventive behavior with 
regard to natural disasters.     24
Second, even though people in the affected areas failed to smooth consumption, 
employed a variety of coping measures depending on the size of the damage they suffered.    We 
speculate that victims combined self- and mutual insurance schemes and did not heavily depend 
on government support, which explains the speed of the recovery.    In the event of a natural 
disaster, the government may create a moral hazard problem by encouraging people to expose 
themselves to greater risks than required [Horwich (2000)].    After the earthquake, the central 
and local governments provided the largest financial support in the history of Japan for the 
reconstruction of the affected areas and to help the victims.    However, because the number of 
those affected was so large, average direct transfers to victims were small.    Our empirical 
results suggest that providing subsidized loans, rather than direct transfers, to victims may be a 
good example of facilitating risk-coping behavior; such interventions are less likely to create 
serious moral hazard problems.    Although we do not deny that the government has to play a 
role in the face of natural disasters, policies to ensure that people take their own precautions are 
necessary for preparing well-designed social safety nets against future natural disasters.     25
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Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the Variables Used 
 





Dummy = 1 if the earthquake caused major housing damage  0.129 
Dummy = 1 if the earthquake caused moderate housing damage    0.175 
Dummy = 1 if the earthquake caused minor housing damage  0.409 
Dummy = 1 if the earthquake caused major household asset damage  0.079 
Dummy = 1 if the earthquake caused minor household asset damage    0.707 
Dummy = 1 if the earthquake adversely affected the health of a family member  0.213 
 
Dummy = 1 for income did not change (default category)  0.593 
Dummy = 1 for income increased  0.062 
Dummy = 1 for income decreased  0.336 





Dummy = 1 if household consumption behavior changed after the earthquake  0.627 
 
Dummy=1 if expenditure on food changed  0.188 
Dummy=1 if expenditure on daily goods changed  0.215 
Dummy=1 if expenditure on clothing changed  0.249 
Dummy=1 if expenditure on luxury goods changed  0.056 
Dummy=1 if expenditure on leisure goods and services changed    0.081 
Dummy=1 if expenditure on gifts changed  0.073 
Dummy=1 if expenditure on furniture changed  0.291 
Dummy=1 if expenditure on electronic products changed  0.152 
Dummy=1 if expenditure on housing changed  0.120 
Dummy=1 if expenditure on emergency supplies changed  0.164 




Dummy = 1 if the household faced an increase in expenditure due to the earthquake  0.803 
 
Dummy = 1 if reallocation between expenditure items was the most important means 
of coping (default category) 
0.250 
 
Dummy = 1 if dissaving was the most important means of coping  0.537 
 
Dummy = 1 if borrowing was the most important means of coping  0.096 
 
Dummy = 1 if receiving transfers was the most important means of coping  0.117 
     29
 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics of the Variables Used (continued) 
 
Description of Variables    Mean 
(Standard Deviation)
Household Characteristics  
Dummy = 1 if the household owned a house prior to the earthquake  0.670 
 
Dummy = 1 if the household had outstanding housing loans prior to the 
earthquake 
0.316 
Age of the respondent  51.168 
(11.479) 
Age squared  2749.872 
(1202.06) 
Dummy = 1 if the highest level of education of the respondent was high 
school  
0.508 
Dummy = 1 if the highest level of education of the respondent was junior 
college or equivalent 
0.221 
Dummy = 1 if the highest level of education of the respondent was 
university 
0.135 
Dummy = 1 if the respondent was single  0.049 
 
Dummy = 1 if the respondent lived with children  0.614 
 
Dummy = 1 if the respondent lived with parents or grandchildren  0.184 
   
Regional Dummy Variables  
Dummy = 1 for Higashinada Ward (default category)  0.125 
Dummy = 1 for Kita Ward  0.170 
Dummy = 1 for Suma Ward  0.145 
Dummy = 1 for Akashi City  0.334 
Dummy = 1 for Nishinomiya City  0.210 




Note: Numbers in parentheses represent standard deviations. 
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Table 2: Tests of Full Consumption Risk-Sharing 
 





















































Dummy = 1 if minor household asset 
damage  
0.205 









Dummy = 1 if adversely affected the 
health of a family member 
0.240 









Dummy = 1 if owned a house prior to the 
earthquake 
-0.238 









Dummy = 1 if had outstanding housing 

































































































































































Note: The dependent variable was a dummy that took a value of one if household expenditure behavior with regard to each 
item changed after the earthquake and a value of zero otherwise. The Wald test is performed for the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients on shock variables are jointly zero (p-value).  Coefficients rather than marginal effects are reported. 
Huber-White consistent robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.  *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.   
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Table 2: Tests of Full Consumption Risk-Sharing (continued) 
 






































































Dummy = 1 if adversely affected the health 























Dummy = 1 if had outstanding housing loans 

































































































































































Note: The dependent variable was a dummy that took a value of one if household expenditure behavior with regard to each 
item changed after the earthquake and a value of zero otherwise. The Wald test is performed for the null hypothesis that the 
coefficients on shock variables are jointly zero (p-value).  Coefficients rather than marginal effects are reported. 
Huber-White consistent robust standard errors are shown in parentheses.  *, **, and *** indicate statistical significance at 
the 10%, 5%, and 1% level, respectively.     32
 
Table 3: Determinants of Different Risk-Coping Strategies 







Dummy = 1 for income increased  0.184 
(0.365) 
0.692 
  (0.326)** 
-0.313 
(0.298) 












Dummy = 1 if the earthquake caused major housing damage    1.195 





Dummy = 1 if the earthquake caused moderate housing damage    1.180 
   ( 0 . 3 9 4 ) * * *
0.746 
  (0.292)** 
-0.062 
(0.204) 
Dummy = 1 if the earthquake caused minor housing damage    0.803 





























































Dummy = 1 if the highest level of education of the respondent was 

































Dummy =1 if Kita Ward  -0.371 
(0.337) 
-0.838 
  (0.347)** 
-0.009 
(0.224) 












Dummy=1 if Nishinomiya City  -0.029 
(0.271) 
-0.697 
  (0.295)** 
0.334 
(0.211 

















522 522  522 
Note: Coefficients rather than marginal effects are reported.  Huber-White consistent robust standard errors are shown in 




Covariances of Error Terms 
 
 Covariance  Standard 
Error 
    
Covariance between ε1 and ε2 
 
0.110 (0.132) 
Covariance between ε1 and ε3 
 
-0.674 (0.069)*** 
Covariance between ε2 and ε3 -0.736  (0.068)*** 
    
Note: *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 10%, 5% and 1% level, respectively. 
 